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Background
• NASA’s Unmanned Aircraft Systems Integration into the National Airspace 
System (UAS in the NAS) Project has been investigating the technical barriers 
associated with the full integration of UAS into civil airspace
• Its research has been conducted in collaboration with RTCA Special Committee 
228 (SC-228), responsible for developing the Minimum Operational 
Performance Standards (MOPS) for UAS 
– SC-228 is made up of experts from government, industry and academia
– Technical focus has been on two critical technology areas identified by the FAA: 
Command and Control (C2) and Detect and Avoid (DAA)
• DAA MOPS cover the technical requirements for supporting a means of 
compliance with Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (14CFR) Part 91, sections 
.3, .111, .113(b) and .181(b)
– In essence, pilots have the authority to “see and avoid” other aircraft to maintain 
“well clear”
– In manned aviation, well clear is a subjectively-defined separation standard 
intended to prevent the need for collision avoidance maneuvers
• UAS developers, however, must redesign this function for remote pilots
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Background
• At a minimum, a DAA system provides a pilot on the ground with electronic 
information to maintain and regain DAA well clear (DWC)
– Unlike the concept in manned aviation, DWC has been mathematically defined
– The electronic information should help the pilot:
1. Detect potential threats to DWC
2. Determine an appropriate response
3. Execute the evasive maneuver
• A series of human-in-the-loop experiments were conducted to identify the 
minimum information requirements for a DAA display (4,5,6,7)
– Response time data, loss of DAA well clear data and subjective data were all used 
to help identify the display features most useful for pilots performing the DAA task
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Previous Research
• Earlier simulations focused on providing the pilots with either Informative or 
Directive DAA displays (4,5)
– Informative DAA displays provide pilots with basic alerting and traffic information
– Directive DAA displays provide pilots with an additional layer of guidance in the 
form of a single recommended resolution maneuver
– Directive maneuver guidance display configurations were found to lead to faster 
pilot responses and fewer DWC violations (although the differences were not 
always statistically significant)
• While Informative displays seemed insufficient, Directive displays were 
determined to be too difficult to certify as a DAA solution
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Previous Research
• The next two HITLs focused on investigating different types of Suggestive DAA 
displays
– Suggestive DAA displays provide pilots with a range of solutions, leaving it up to 
the pilot to make the ultimate decision
– Provides more guidance than Informative displays but easier to certify than 
Directive displays
• The most effective type of Suggestive DAA display that was tested was 
“banding,” which used dynamic and constantly-available color-coded arcs to 
show the threat level associated with nearby headings and altitudes
– Proved more effective than an Informative display and a different Suggestive 
display tool that required direct pilot interaction
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Purpose
• By the last of the first four HITLs, suggestive DAA maneuver guidance was 
identified as a minimum requirement
– It also highlighted the need for secondary maneuver guidance for when a loss of 
DWC cannot be avoided (without which the pilot has no positive guidance)
• The current study was the last in a series of human-in-the-loop experiments 
designed to identify the minimum information requirements for a DAA display
– Served to validate the alerting and display requirements as specified in the DAA 
MOPS
• Traffic information available in earlier studies but not in draft version of DAA MOPS was 
removed here (e.g., call sign, absolute altitude, ground speed, vertical rate)
– Unlike earlier experiments, we did not vary the type of DAA information provided 
to pilots
• Instead, the performance was compared to earlier studies that did not directly conform 
to the DAA MOPS
– Two display configurations were tested: Integrated and Standalone
• Both allowable under the DAA MOPS
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Method
• Experimental Design
– Display Configuration (within-subjects)
• Integrated DAA display – all DAA information presented within primary navigation and 
control display (i.e., tactical situation display – TSD)
• Standalone DAA display – all DAA information presented within a separate, boot-
strapped display, which contained no navigation information or control interfaces
– Threat Type at First Alert (embedded)
• Corrective– caution-level alert when first detected by the DAA system
• Warning – warning-level alert when first detected by the DAA system
• Participants
– 16 active duty UAS pilots
• Average Age: 30
• Average hours of UAS military experience: 600
• Average hours of UAS experience in civil airspace: 60
– 2 active National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA) controllers
• Served as confederates
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Method
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Integrated 
Configuration
Tactical Situation Display (TSD)
• Navigation information
• Vehicle control interfaces
• DAA information
Side Panel
• Telemetry 
information
• Chat client
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Tactical Situation Display (TSD)
• Navigation information
• Vehicle control interfaces
Side Panel
• Telemetry 
information
• Chat client
DAA Display
• DAA information
Standalone
Configuration
Icon Alert Level
Expected Pilot 
Response
Buffered Well Clear 
Criteria
Time to Loss of 
Well Clear
Aural Alert
Verbiage
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DAA Warning 
Alert
Maneuver immediately
HMD = 0.75 nm
ZTHR = 450 ft
modTau = 35 sec
25 sec
“Traffic, 
Maneuver
Now”  x2
Corrective DAA 
Alert
Maneuver following ATC 
approval
HMD = 0.75 nm
ZTHR = 450 ft
modTau = 35 sec
55 sec “Traffic, Avoid”
Preventive DAA 
Alert
Monitor traffic; 
maneuver not currently 
required
HMD = 0.75-1.0 nm
ZTHR = 450-700 ft
modTau = 35 sec
N/A
“Traffic, 
Monitor”
Guidance Traffic 
Alert
No maneuver required
Associated with 
banding outside 
current course
N/A N/A
Remaining 
Traffic
No maneuver required
Within surveillance 
field of regard
N/A N/A
Method
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Method
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• JADEM Omni Bands served as suggestive maneuver guidance
• Headings ‘bands’ appear on the inner range ring
• Altitude ‘bands’ appear to the far left of the TSD
• Bands updated constantly to reflect current threat level for 
range of headings/altitudes
Altitude Bands
Heading Bands
Method
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Method
• If algorithm determines 
horizontal maneuver will lead 
to greatest separation:
• Shown optimal heading region 
(“wedge”) to fly next to ownship
• If algorithm determines vertical
maneuver will lead to greatest 
separation:
• Green altitude block (“wedge”) within 
altitude tape shows optimal altitude 
range
• Vertical WCR never provided against 
cooperative intruders
NOTE:  No aural alert at this stage
Method
14
Procedure
• Task:
– Fly simulated MQ-9 through Class E airspace (Oakland Center – ZOA 
40/41)
• Navigate along pre-filed routes (used AFRL’s Vigilant Spirit Control Station)
– 2 different routes flown (HAWK21 & SAMP61)
• Attend to secondary tasks (e.g., chat messages, system alerts)
– Maintain well clear
• Coordinate with ATC (time permitting)
• Pre-planned conflicts with ownship
– 6 scripted encounters predicted to lose well clear designed to address 
major functional areas of DAA:
• Multi-threat (1 coop & 1 non-coop)
• Blunder-causing DAA Warning
• High speed encounter
• Vertical transitioning encounter
• Ownship in climb/descent
• Preventive DAA alerts
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Procedure
• Simulation Hardware/Software:
– Vigilant Spirit Control Station (VSCS) from AFRL
• 2 instances run simultaneously, each with a different UAS mission route
– Perfect surveillance data (no uncertainty models applied but did have 
representative sensor ranges)
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HAWK21 SAMP61
Scenarios
• Mission routes located within 
Oakland Center (ZOA40/41)
– Both mission routes operated with 
Oakland Center airspace
– Includes a variety of classes of 
airspace
• IFR traffic into and out of SFO and 
OAK
• VFR traffic from smaller airports 
(e.g., STS and APC)
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Scenarios
• Fire Line Track (HAWK21)
– Level at 9000’
– Serving as air asset for California Department of Forestry for fire burning north of 
Clear Lake
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Scenarios
• Air Sampling Track (SAMP61)
– Starts at 10000’, contains climb & descent
– Serving as air asset for California Air Resources Board to measure quality of air east 
of Santa Rosa
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Climb to 
14000’
Descent 
to 6000’
Procedure
• Simulation confederates
– NATCA controller managed UAS and manned traffic within ZOA 40/41
• Simulated manned traffic based on actual sector activity
– Pseudo-pilots managed all manned traffic to provide dynamic sector activity
– ATC SME operated as ‘ghost’ controller to ensure conflicts were generated
– HSI researcher operated VSCS internal conflict generator
20ATC Station Pseudo Pilot Station
Research Questions
• Primary:
– Is pilot performance with minimum display requirements (as currently defined 
in the draft MOPS) comparable to previous simulations?
• Secondary: 
– Any impact of the display configuration variable (Standalone vs. Integrated)?
– What effect did threat type at first alert have on performance (Caution vs. 
Warning)?
• Metrics
– Measured Response
• Initial response time – time to initiate a response to a detected threat
• Edit time – time spent interacting with vehicle control interfaces
• Aircraft response time – total time to send first upload to aircraft (initial + edit response time)
– Separation Metrics
• Proportion of Loss of DWC – rate of loss of DWC out of those predicted to lose separation
• Loss of DWC severity – proportion of the DWC volume the intruder penetrated
• Loss of DWC categorization – cause of the loss of DWC
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RESULTS
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Measured Response
• Significant main effect of display configuration on aircraft response times
– Difference of 1.3sec
• Warning alert associated with ~8sec reduction
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Aircraft Response Time
Measured Response
• Source of reduction in aircraft response times a result of faster initial 
responses (not shorter edit times)
– Integrated condition associated with 1.4sec faster initial response times but 0.2sec 
slower edit times
– Warning alerts had larger effect on initial response times (~6sec) than edit times 
(~2sec)
24Initial Response Time Edit Time
18.83
11.93
17.75
8.13
0
5
10
15
20
25
Standalone CORR Standalone WARN Integrated CORR Integrated WARN
S
ec
o
n
d
s
Part Task 6 (Current Study)
21.75
9.70
0
5
10
15
20
25
Corrective Warning
S
ec
o
n
d
s
Part Task 5 (2015)
Measured Response
• Aircraft response times compare favorably to most recent HITL (Part Task 5)
– Both display configurations in current study associated with shorter responses to 
caution-level alert
– Integrated condition associated with shorter responses to warning-level alert
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Standalone Integrated
CORR WARN CORR WARN
Loss of DAA Well Clear Proportion
• All encounters (Corrective & Warning at first alert):
– 16 total LoDWC (out of 466 total encounters; =3%) 
• Standalone = 9 total LoWC
• Integrated = 7 total LoWC
– Not significantly different
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• LoDWC most common with less than 25sec to loss of well clear at 
time of first alert
– One encounter was scripted to make 90deg turn into ownship late into 
problem to force appearance of well clear recovery
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Onset of DAA 
Warning Alert
1/5
4/399
1/1
7/13
3/18
Diagnosing Losses
• 11 occurred as a result of having less than 25sec to a loss of DWC
• Remaining 5 LoWC when intruder was Corrective at First Alert
– Standalone (4 LoWC)
• 1 instance had a mismatched between DAA and TSD display orientations
• 2 instances where pilot made ineffective heading changes
– Separate displays may have made it harder for pilot to determine necessary 
maneuver size
– Also failed to notice bands had changed by time upload sent
• 1 instance where pilot failed to notice altitude bands were no longer threat-
free by time upload was made
– Integrated (1 LoWC)
• 1 instance where pilot failed to notice altitude bands were no longer threat-
free by time upload was made
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LoWC Example
29
Loss of DAA Well Clear Proportion
• Rate of loss of DWC compares favorably to previous study
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LoWC Severity
• LoWC Severity (SLoWC) higher in Standalone condition, but still low overall
– SLoWC = % penetration of well clear (higher = greater penetration)
• Mean for both display configurations <10%
– No single LoWC exceeded 30% penetration
• Pilots likely benefited from guidance to regain DAA well clear
– Cannot be compared to previous study since first time this metric has been used
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ATC Coordination
• Pilot consistently received approval from ATC prior to maneuvering away from their 
mission route for Corrective alert
– Much less common (as expected) in response to Warning alerts
• Pilots received approval to return to course consistently across all conditions
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Maneuver Statistics
• Maneuver Preference
– Lateral maneuvers most common (61%)
– Climbs more common than descents or 
level-ing off
– < 10% of the time pilots maneuvered in both 
dimensions
• Maneuver Size
– Lateral
• No substantial difference between display 
configurations on size of lateral maneuvers
– Vertical
• 18% of vertical maneuvers were 500ft
• 82% were 1000ft
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Conclusions
• Overall pilot performance was consistent with previous simulations 
when using minimum display, alerting & guidance requirements
– On some measured response metrics performance was slightly better
– Proportions of LoWC virtually identical
– Standalone display resulted in little to no performance differences compared to 
the Integrated display configuration
 Data supports display, alerting & guidance requirements as currently drafted
• Altitude tape needs to be on right side DAA display (frequently 
disregarded) and as close to the center of their field of view as possible
– In both the Standalone and Integrated conditions pilots uploaded a vertical 
maneuver that was no longer conflict-free according to DAA altitude bands
 Added requirement for placement of DAA vertical guidance
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• QUESTIONS?
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